P atient cost sharing lowers health care spending because individuals tend to use fewer health services when they are required to pay a portion of the cost compared with full insurance. 1, 2 It has been argued in the health insurance literature that, if demand for certain health services is highly responsive to price changes, patients do not derive high value from those services. 3, 4 Because the demand for mental health services is highly responsive to price changes, some researchers have argued that there is an efficiency rationale for higher cost sharing for mental health care. 5 However, empirical work suggests that patients subject to cost sharing reduce their use of not only low-value but also high-value care. 6, 7 For certain illnesses, higher cost sharing may lead to undesirable consequences, potentially with downstream costs that more than offset the policy's savings. 8, 9 For the patient, these broadly defined costs could include worse health from forgone treatment and the disutility of using downstream services relative to regular services. For society, these costs could include the greater expense of providing downstream services to patients in worse health. The literature raises several questions. Does the negative association between higher cost sharing and the use of mental health care vary based on observable patient characteristics? Is the reduced use of mental health care associated with an increase in downstream costs to the patient or society? If so, should cost sharing for certain patients be lower than for others? We investigated these questions using a quasiexperimental study design in the Netherlands, where mandatory cost sharing for specialist mental health (including substance use) services was increased and a unique data set of treatment records for 87% of all specialist mental health patients from 2010 to 2012 was available. Our study assessed whether, after the reform, fewer adult patients received outpatient or inpatient treatment by income and major diagnosis category, including the seriously ill, who may benefit greatly from treatment. 10 Because youths did not face the costsharing reform, they formed a natural unaffected control group to examine the influence of the cost-sharing reform on adult use of mental health services. Next, we investigated whether the reform was associated with greater involuntary commitment or acute mental health care use among adults and whether the resulting costs were outweighed by the savings from reduced regular care for each of the major diagnosis categories.
Methods

Setting
The Netherlands has a long history of universal health insurance with comprehensive coverage, 11 low out-of-pocket expenditures, 12 and premium subsidies for low-income individuals. Before 2012, the single health care-wide annual deductible, which applied to total costs summed across all types of specialist health care, had not been more than €170 (US$192). However, to combat increasing mental health care costs, the Dutch national government increased the out-of-pocket price for outpatient and inpatient specialist mental health care effective January 1, 2012. For outpatient care, adult patients were required to pay €100 (US$113) out of pocket to open a treatment record and an additional €100 (US$113) if they received a total of more than 100 minutes of care during that treatment record. For inpatient care, adult patients were required to pay a monthly co-pay of €150 (US$169). We therefore examined whether a higher out-of-pocket price for mental health care led to savings and negative downstream consequences. The data were deidentified before we obtained them, and the project was determined not human subjects research by Harvard's institutional review board. For these reasons, ethics approval was not required for this study.
A mental health treatment record worked as follows. The physician opened a treatment record when the patient started treatment, and a single treatment record covered all of the patient's care for up to 365 days after the date that the record was opened. However, all treatment records automatically closed after 365 days; to continue treatment, a patient then had to open a new treatment record. Consequently, patients were affected by the postreform out-of-pocket prices if and only if their treatment record was opened in 2012 .
The reform applied to all adults irrespective of their income but did not apply to youths (those 17 years or younger on the date when a treatment record was opened), did not affect the out-of-pocket price for medication or primary care, and did not apply to involuntary commitment or acute mental health care. Involuntary commitment occurred when a civil court of justice committed unwilling patients who presented a threat to themselves or others in accordance with the Law on Special Admissions in Psychiatric Hospitals. Acute mental health care, which was on a voluntary basis and could last no more than 28 days, was care offered only to individuals who required immediate treatment because they posed a threat to themselves or caused a public nuisance. 13 Because the commitment procedure was involuntary and acute care could only last a short duration, involuntary commitment and acute care were unlikely to be substitutes for individuals who wanted to circumvent the postreform increase in the out-of-pocket price of regular care. See eMethods in the Supplement for additional institutional details.
Key Points
Questions Does higher patient cost sharing for mental health care reduce use and, if so, increase downstream costs to the patient or society?
Findings This study of 1 448 541 treatment records in the Netherlands found that a national reform that increased cost sharing led to reduced use of mental health care for severe and mild disorders, especially in low-income neighborhoods. Overall, this reduced use created net savings, but for patients with psychotic disorder or bipolar disorder, the reform was associated with costly increases in involuntary commitment and acute mental health care.
Meaning
Higher cost sharing for seriously ill patients could create substantial downstream costs.
Measure of Use and Data Source
The cost-sharing reform primarily affected an individual's decision to open a treatment record as opposed to how much treatment to seek during a treatment record. Therefore, we measured mental health care use by the number of treatment records that were opened each day. Our data consisted of all individual-level, administrative mental health treatment records from all 110 member organizations of the Dutch association for mental health service providers (GGZ-NL) from January 1, 2010, through December 31, 2012. Data analysis was performed from January 18, 2016, to May 9, 2017. Members of GGZ-NL treated 87% of all specialist mental health records in the Netherlands during the observation period. The remaining 13% of records had a relatively low degree of complexity and were treated by small organizations. For each treatment record, we observed the following: patient sex and year of birth, the start and end date of the record, the type of treatment, whether the patient received any acute mental health care during the record, one DSM-IV-based primary diagnosis code, the number of inpatient and outpatient treatment minutes, and the 4-digit postal code of the patient's residence.
Study Population
We separated adults, those who turned 19 years or older in the year that they opened a treatment record and were thus affected by the reform, from youths, those who turned 15 through 17 years old and thus formed a control group that was unaffected by the reform. We observed year of birth rather than the exact date of birth; thus, we measured a patient's age by subtracting the patient's birth year from the year when the patient's treatment record was opened. We could not determine whether individuals aged 18 years according to our measure were in fact 18 years of age (ie, affected by the reform if they started treatment in 2012) or 17 years of age (ie, youths unaffected by the reform) on the date when their treatment record was opened. For this reason, we excluded individuals aged 18 years from the analysis (eMethods in the Supplement). We also excluded those whom we measured as 14 years or younger to make our youth sample more comparable to the adult sample. For adults and youths, we created 3 mutually exclusive samples: a regular treatment sample, a sample with the involuntary commitment records, and a sample with the acute treatment records (eMethods in the Supplement). From the recorded primary diagnosis, we classified each treatment record into 1 of 9 major diagnosis categories (eMethods and eTable 1 in the Supplement). This classification allowed us to compare our results for disorders that are considered to be on average more severe, such as psychotic disorder, personality disorder, or bipolar disorder, with those considered to be on average less severe, such as anxiety disorder or depressive disorder. To assign each patient to an income decile, we linked the postal code of a patient's residence to the mean household income in 2012 for that postal code 14 and the number of inhabitants in 2011 for that postal code 15 (eMethods in the Supplement). To calculate costs for each record, we used the national tariff schedule for mental health insurance claims 16 and an estimate for the additional procedural costs per record for involuntary commitment 17 (eMethods in the Supplement).
Statistical Analysis
We used ordinary least squares regression models to estimate the association of the cost-sharing reform with mental health care use, involuntary commitment, and acute care. To investigate whether factors other than the reform were responsible for changes in use, we estimated a difference-indifferences model on the pooled sample of regular treatment records opened for adults and youths. 18 This model contained interactions between all covariates from the baseline model and an indicator variable for being in the adult rather than the youth sample (eMethods in the Supplement). For our figures, we obtained residuals from regressions that controlled for day of the week, day of the year, and holidays to separate structural changes from seasonal patterns. After adding the mean daily openings in 2011 to these residuals, we plotted these mean-shifted residuals to show detrended daily openings across the 3 years (eMethods in the Supplement). We calculated P values using a 2-sided t test. Because we tested multiple hypotheses, P < .002 was considered to be statisti- 19, 20 By contrast, the raw decrease of 14.8% from 2011 to 2012 departed significantly from the prior annual trends (eFigure in the Supplement). In addition, Table 1 provides the total annual number of treatment records opened for involuntary civil commitment and for acute care in the adult sample. Of the patients who were committed involuntarily, 63.7% were diagnosed with psychotic disorder and 12.6% with bipolar disorder. The median duration of an acute treatment record was 5 days (interquartile range, 2-17 days), and 64.2% of patients who received acute care had treatment records with a missing primary diagnosis (providers were not required to report a diagnosis on treatment records for acute care).
Results
Characteristics of Treatment Records
In contrast to our findings for adults, the use of regular care among youths increased slightly and the use of involuntary commitment and acute care decreased slightly after the reform (eTable 2 in the Supplement).
Use and Downstream Effects
Conditional on covariates, the number of daily openings of regular treatment records among adults decreased persistently by 13.4% (95% CI, −16.0% to −10.8%; P < .001) when the costsharing reform was introduced on January 1, 2012 ( Figure 1A , Table 2 , and eTable 3 in the Supplement). In contrast, the number of daily openings of regular treatment records in the control group of unaffected youths increased slightly ( Figure 1B and eTable 4 and eTable 5 in the Supplement). Our difference-indifferences model, which included adults and youths, yielded an estimate of −15.4% (95% CI, −18.5% to −12.3%; P < .001). This finding of reduced use remained significant when we accounted for the possibility that individuals may have anticipated the reform (eResults in the Supplement).
The number of daily records opened for adults increased by 96.8% (95% CI, 87.7%-105.9%; P < .001) for involuntary commitment and by 25.1% (95% CI, 20.8%-29.4%; P < .001) for acute care ( Figure 1C and D and Table 2 ). The difference-in-differences Figure 2A shows the overlaid residual plots for each of the 10 income deciles. Before the reform, treatment rates in the poorest decile had been 2.7 times higher than those in the richest decile. The reduction in the demand for treatment was significantly greater in poorer neighborhoods than in richer neighborhoods (Table 2 and eTable 6 in the Supplement). Figure 2B shows the overlaid residual plots for the 5 major diagnoses with the greatest number of treatment records. Overall, the demand response was statistically significant for all major diagnosis categories ( Table 2 and eTable 7 in the Supplement). The number of records opened each day for patients with psychotic disorder decreased by 10.6% (95% CI, −14.5% to −6.7%; P < .001), which was not much smaller than the estimated effect for patients with depressive disorder (−13.8%; 95% CI, −17.1% to −10.4%; P < .001) or anxiety disorder (−13.1%; 95% CI, −16.2% to −10.0%; P < .001). Figure 2C shows that the increase in involuntary commitment after the reform was driven primarily by patients diagnosed with psychotic disorder and, to a lesser extent, by patients diagnosed with bipolar disorder. Figure 2D shows that the increase in acute care after the reform was driven by patients whose diagnoses were recorded as missing. Table 3 gives the estimated changes in mental health care spending after the reform by diagnosis. For adults, the annual number of regular treatment records decreased by 58 498, which generated total savings of €70.4 million (US$79.4 million). Meanwhile, involuntary commitment increased by 1064 and acute care increased by 5066, which generated total costs of €57.0 million (US$64.3 million). Consequently, the reform saved an estimated €13.4 million (US$15.1 million) more than it cost. Net savings were largest for depressive disorder at €15.3 million (US$17.3 million) and anxiety disorder at €9.8 million (US$11.1 million). However, net savings were negative for psychotic disorder at −€19.5 million (−US$22.0 million) and bipolar disorder at −€6.0 million (−US$6.8 million).
Heterogeneity by Neighborhood Income and Major Diagnosis
Costs vs Savings
Discussion
After 8 years of increases, the number of mental health treatment records opened by adults in the Netherlands decreased when cost sharing for mental health care increased in 2012.
The size of this decrease was significant for severe and mild disorders and larger in low-income than in high-income neighborhoods. Simultaneously, among adults, involuntary commitment almost doubled and acute mental health care increased by 25% between 2011 and 2012. On aggregate, the reform was associated with estimated net savings in treatment costs of €13.4 million (US$15.1 million). However, for individuals with psychotic disorder or bipolar disorder, the additional costs for involuntary commitment and acute care exceeded savings by €25.5 million (US$28.8 million) because of fewer patients in regular care. Our study is the first, to our knowledge, to investigate the influence of a patient cost-sharing reform for specialist mental health care only and to evaluate the consequences for patients across an entire country. Our empirical strategy is comparable to recent evaluations of cost-sharing reforms in Massachusetts 21, 22 and California 9 and of the increase in the deductible of health insurance plans offered by a large US employer to its employees. 6 Our research design has several advantages. First, our setting provided variation in mental health insurance coverage that was plausibly unrelated to other factors. Second, our estimates were based on observed behavior in response to a real-world policy change. Third, our data allowed us to obtain statistically precise estimates for heterogeneous effects based on patient characteristics of downstream costs as measured by types of treatment.
Our findings contribute to the health care literature and are relevant for policy makers. Because of the large increase in involuntary commitment and acute mental health care, it appears that at least some patients stopped regular treatment even though it was of high value. Optimal policy requires designing a system that incentivizes patients to use services for which the clinical and nonclinical benefits exceed monetary and nonmonetary costs and to forgo services for which the benefits do not justify the cost. Our results do not rule out that higher cost sharing incentivized certain individuals to reduce low-value care. However, the downstream costs that we observed for patients with psychotic disorder and bipolar disorder are an example of how cost sharing can increase rather than decrease total spending for certain populations.
Although the institutional context in the United States differs substantially from that in the Netherlands, where out-ofpocket maximums are lower on average, these results can inform the current US cost-sharing debate. The United States has seen an increase in the number of insured individuals after the implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, as well as a reduction in the coverage gap between mental health care and other health services since the 1980s 23 in large part because of parity legislation. 24 However, average cost sharing for health services has increased among those with private health insurance. 25, 26 Furthermore, public policy seems to be headed toward less rather than more coverage. Our study suggests that reducing coverage for mental health care can lower mental health care costs overall but may have negative unintended consequences for the seriously ill.
Limitations
Our study has several limitations. First, other factors could have influenced the use of mental health care at the time of the reform. However, we found no macroeconomic shocks, demographic shifts, or policy changes around January 1, 2012, that could explain the abrupt and persistent decrease in use in 2012.
To control for any remaining factors, we relied on our difference-in-differences model, which used a sample of youths to construct counterfactual trends, and the results were consistent with the baseline estimates. Second, we could not link treatment records for individuals across time to identify the characteristics of those individuals who discontinued treatment after the reform. Third, we were unable to investigate whether, after the reform, patients substituted away from The Netherlands Mental Health Survey and Incidence Study (NEMESIS) in 2008 showed that the majority of those with common mental disorders such as major depressive disorder and anxiety disorder had access to either mental health facilities embedded within primary care or to specialised mental health care services, but there was high variation in access to treatment. The proportion of respondents with lifetime mental disorders who made lifetime treatment contact ranged between 6.5% and 56.5% for substance use disorders and between 75.3% and 91.4% for mood disorders. Delays in initial treatment contact varied among persons with mood disorders (median=0 years), substance use disorders (0-4 years), impulse-control disorders (4-8 years), and anxiety disorders (0-19 years). The proportion of respondents who reported that they had received helpful treatment ranged from 33.5% for substance use disorders to 69.5% for mood disorders. Men, older cohorts, and respondents with younger age at onset of the disorder generally were more likely to have no lifetime treatment contact, to have longer treatment delay, and to have not received helpful treatment. 2, 3 With regard to severe mental illness (such as patients with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, severe personality disorders or patients with comorbid addiction problems), it has been much more difficult to assess the level of unmet need for services, as patients avoiding care also tend to avoid taking part in epidemiological and mental health care research. Using data from the largest health insurance company in the Netherlands, a recent study showed that over 70% of patients with schizophrenia who were enrolled in assertive community treatment (enrollment is practically universal and compulsory in the Netherlands) were receiving continued care of at least three years. They had access to psychosocial, medical and pharmacological treatment. Gaps in the access to specific services were largest among non-Western immigrants and older people. 4 Cost-Sharing Reform Before 2012, patients faced no form of cost sharing for either outpatient or inpatient specialist mental health services other than the health-care wide annual deductible, which applied to all specialist mental health services. However, in July 2011, the Dutch national government announced that it would increase in 2012 the out-of-pocket price patients face for mental health services. The Dutch Minister of Health believed that a higher out-of-pocket price would discourage patients from using low-value mental health care and thus combat rising mental health care costs, 5 which since 2000 had grown at a rate two times higher than the growth rate of all other health care costs. 6 The calendar year in which the patient's treatment record was opened determined the cost-sharing regime the patient faced for that record. Consequently, patients who had opened a treatment record in 2011 did not face the post-reform out-of-pocket price at any point during that treatment record even if it extended into 2012. However, any patient who opened a treatment record for outpatient care in 2012 had to agree to pay €100 out of pocket on (at most) two occasions during the duration of the record: the opening and the 100-minute mark of the treatment record.
In addition to the cost-sharing reform for specialist mental health services, the single health carewide annual deductible was raised from €170 in 2011 to €220 in 2012. The post-reform out-of-pocket prices for mental health services were separate from and on top of the health care-wide annual deductible. For example, adult patients who required more than 100 minutes of outpatient mental health care over the course of a treatment record and did not face other health expenditures went from facing an out-of-pocket price of €170 in 2011 to an out-of-pocket price of €420 in 2012. In theory, such patients should have opened in 2012 a treatment record with more than 100 total minutes of care if and only if they valued their specialist mental health care above €420. Beyond the 100-minute threshold, the reform introduced no changes that affected the patient's decision on the intensive margin, that is, how many minutes of treatment to receive during the record. Between 2011 and 2012, other than the reform, there were no changes that affected the delivery of specialist mental health care and its potential substitutes, such as primary care or medication.
Sample Age Restriction
We measured a patient's age by subtracting the patient's birth year from the year when the patient's treatment record was opened. So, those who we assigned an age A were either age A or age A -1 on the date that their treatment record was opened. The reform applied only to patients who were 18 or older on the date their treatment record was opened, but we could not determine whether or not the reform applied to those we measured as 18 years old. For example, a patient who opened a treatment record on July 1 st , 2012 and had a birth year of 1994 was assigned an age of 18. If that patient had been born before July 1 st , 1994, that patient would have faced the cost-sharing reform. However, if that patient had been born after July 1 st , 1994, then the patient in fact would have been 17 on the date that the treatment record was opened and would not have faced the cost-sharing reform. For this reason, we dropped 18-year-olds from the analysis.
Involuntary Commitment Specialist mental health care providers in the Netherlands were mandated by law to report to a central database a set of variables describing each treatment record that resulted in a health insurance claim, including a three-digit code indicating the type of treatment. 7 We identified involuntary civil commitment from these codes: "rechterlijke machtiging" (110 and 206), "rechterlijke machtiging met voorwaarden" (116 and 211), and "inbewaringstelling" (111). These three types of involuntary civil commitment are described in the Dutch law on Bijzondere Opnemingen in Psychiatrische Ziekenhuizen (BOPZ), or special commitments in psychiatric hospitals. Rechterlijke machtiging refers to involuntary commitment in a psychiatric hospital by a civil court, rechterlijke machtiging met voorwaarden refers to civil courtmandated treatment with specific conditions to prevent involuntary commitment in a psychiatric hospital, and inbewaringstelling refers to urgent involuntary commitment in a psychiatric hospital as mandated by a municipal mayor. An additional set of codes, "jeugdstrafrecht" (117 and 212), related to involuntary commitment for youths in a criminal (as opposed to civil) law framework. Because forensic mental health treatment of adults was provided in a separate provider system and not represented in our data, we dropped treatment records with either of those codes from our sample.
Acute Care
Acute mental health care served individuals who were in crisis, which was formally defined as "an acute situation of a patient which makes direct intervention (medically) necessary in order to avert direct danger to the person or his/her environment, or to end severe nuisance." An acute situation was defined as "the consequence of a mental disorder, i.e. serious impairment of judgment, and in particular a psychotic episode in which behavior is caused by hallucinations or delusions, acute threat of suicide, or severe confusion because of organic brain syndrome."
8 Acute mental health care was provided by 24/7 acute psychiatry units, and their staff always included psychiatrists, nurses, and ancillary personnel. They provided acute care only if they received a request to intervene in the situation or to consult the patient. Referrals to acute care came from primary care physicians (40% of referrals), the police (15% of referrals) and other agencies such as the patient's regular therapist or a hospital emergency department (45% of referrals). The acute psychiatry units were often embedded within the larger and regionally operating mental health institutions, who also ran high intensive care inpatient facilities and organized intensive home treatment with the aim to avoid crisis situations or admittances to inpatient facilities. General hospital emergency departments had close contact with acute psychiatry units and sometimes served as the home base for such facilities. 9 We used the indicator for acute treatment and the number of days in treatment to identify treatment records opened for acute mental health care. An acute treatment record could be either its own treatment record, which could last no more than 28 days, or part of a regular treatment record. Because we were interested in acute treatment records of individuals who were not already in regular treatment, we coded as acute care only those treatment records that both had an indicator for acute treatment and lasted 28 days or less. We considered a treatment record that was classified both as acute care and involuntary civil commitment as the latter.
Categorizing Primary Diagnoses Mental health providers in the Netherlands used a diagnostic system, known as DIS codes, to code the primary diagnosis for a treatment record. The DIS codes followed the DSM-IV structure precisely. Each code began with either "as1" or "as2" to indicate the diagnosis axis and then was followed by a sequence of up to five delimited numeric entries. Every additional numeric entry represented an added level of specificity for the diagnosis. For example, as1_6 represented mood disorder, as1_6.02 represented bipolar disorder, as1_6.02.01 represented bipolar I disorder, as1_6.02.01.03 represented bipolar I disorder where the last episode was manic, and as1_6.02.01.03.05 represented bipolar I disorder where the last episode was manic and the patient was partially in remission.
Each of the 689 observed primary diagnosis codes was an element of a main diagnostic class, which we defined as the DIS code collapsed to the first numeric entry after the axis code. For example, treatment records with primary diagnosis codes of as1_1.01.01 and as1_1.05.01.03.01 were both elements of the as1_1 main diagnostic class. In addition, because mood disorder was such a large class, we separated it into depressive disorder (as1_6_01) and bipolar disorder (as1_6_02), and we treated each of those as its own main diagnostic class. As a result, each primary diagnosis code was an element of one of 24 main diagnostic classes.
For codes at a sufficiently high level of specificity, the Dutch Health Care Authority provided a correspondence between the DIS code and the ICD-10 classification system. 10 eTable1 provides for each of these main diagnostic classes all of the ICD-10 codes that correspond to any of the specific diagnoses within that class. In some cases, different DIS codes corresponded to the same ICD-10 code. We classified the primary diagnosis of the treatment record according to the DSM-IV based DIS classification as opposed to the ICD-10 classification.
We excluded from the analysis two main diagnostic classes that were dropped from coverage in 2012 and 2013: adjustment disorder and the main diagnosis class called "other conditions that may be a focus of clinical attention." 11 The interpretation of our results relied on the assumption that those who would have been treated for these two main diagnostic classes if these had still been covered did not open a treatment record in 2012 that led to a mental health insurance claim. If some of these patients were diagnosed differently in 2012 such that their treatment was still covered, then our estimates would underestimate the magnitude of the association between the reform and regular mental health care use. For example, our estimates would underestimate the decrease in treatment for illnesses like depressive disorder and anxiety disorder, which would be expected to be the closest substitute for treatment for adjustment disorders or "other conditions that may be a focus of clinical attention." In addition to these two diagnostic classes that were phased out of coverage, we excluded dementia, delirium, or amnesia, which were mostly treated outside of the specialist mental health care system. 12 After excluding these, the six most represented main diagnostic classes in the data were: depressive disorder; substance-related disorder; anxiety disorder; personality disorder; psychotic disorder; disorder first diagnosed in childhood; and bipolar disorder. To be concise, we then pooled into one "miscellaneous" category the 13 of those diagnostic classes with the fewest treatment records: other mental disorders due to a known physiological condition; somatoform disorder; factitious disorder; dissociative disorder; sexual and gender identity disorder; eating disorder; sleeping disorder; impulse control disorder; additional codes/no diagnosis; childhood disorder; and all axis 2 disorders excluding personality disorders. Finally, we created a separate category for those administrative treatment records missing a diagnosis. The resulting nine major diagnosis categories were: depressive disorder; substance-related disorder; anxiety disorder; psychotic disorder; personality disorder; missing; disorder first diagnosed in childhood; miscellaneous disorder; and bipolar disorder.
Constructing Income Deciles
To measure a patient's income decile, we linked the patient's four-digit postal code to the mean household income in 2012 for that postal code 13 and the number of inhabitants in 2011 for that postal code. 14 We then ranked the four-digit postal codes by mean household income and split the sample into 10 income deciles with total postal code populations of approximately equal size. Of the 4,940 postal codes we observed in our data, we were able to link 3,520 to their mean household income. For privacy reasons, postal codes with fewer than 200 residents were excluded from the 2012 income data.
Calculating Treatment Costs A tariff schedule provides the nationally set reimbursement amounts for specialist mental health care in the Netherlands. 15 The amounts were based on the total number of treatment minutes for the record, the type of treatment (e.g. acute versus regular) and the primary diagnosis. In addition, there was a daily cost for each day of inpatient care that varied based on the intensity of the inpatient treatment. For regular care and acute care, the record's total treatment minutes and primary diagnosis were sufficient to calculate the cost associated with those records. For involuntary civil commitment, we counted records with care type of "Rechterlijke Machtiging" or "Inbewaringstelling" (see above) as receiving intensive inpatient care according to category E in the tariff schedule, which cost €317.81 per day. We also counted the procedural costs of involuntary commitment, which were estimated at €2,538 per record in 2012.
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Baseline Regression Model The results presented in Table 2 of the paper were based on an ordinary least squares regression model. The model specification was motivated by two goals. First, we wanted to do statistical inference, and in particular, to compute confidence intervals for our estimates of how the cost-sharing reform was associated with the use of different types of mental health care. Second, we wanted a way to control for factors that were correlated with the reform and that could have influenced the number of treatment records opened in each year. A simple comparison of the total number of treatment records opened each year met neither of these goals. At the same time, we faced an important constraint in choosing a statistical model: we could not observe in our data individuals who were not in treatment. Consequently, we were unable to estimate a regression model in which individuals were the unit of observation and the outcome variable was a binary indicator for being in treatment, because all individuals in our sample would then have had the same outcome value.
To meet our objectives, we chose as the units of observation the calendar days from January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2012 and as the dependent variable the (scaled) number of treatment records opened each day, which we constructed from the individual-level treatment records. The resulting 1,096 daily observations for each sample provided ample degrees of freedom for conducting statistical inference and computing confidence intervals. In addition, this model allowed us to control for factors other than the reform that could have influenced the number of treatment records opened in each year, specifically the fact that different years had a different total number of Mondays, Tuesdays, and so forth, and that 2012 was a leap year. Finally, for our dependent variable, we counted a treatment record towards the day's total only if the treatment record was opened on that day (as opposed to including records that remained open on that day but had been opened earlier). This way, all treatment records that were counted towards the total for a given day faced the same cost-sharing regime (i.e. any given day's total number of treatment records never included records both from individuals who faced and individuals who did not face the higher out-ofpocket price).
We estimated the following regression equation separately for each outcome:
Scalar denotes the number of daily openings of treatment records, and for the models with coefficients in terms of percentages, this scalar was divided by the mean number of daily openings in 2011 (which was 1,238.8 for adults in regular care) and multiplied by 100. is a constant, is a vector with elements indicating whether the observation refers to 2010 or 2012 (2011 is the baseline year), is a vector of day-of-the-year dummies, is a vector of day-of-the-week dummies, and is the error term. The second element of is our coefficient of interest, which indicates either the percentage point or the absolute drop in the mean number of daily openings in 2012 relative to 2011, conditional on control variables. We computed Newey-West standard errors. 17 We tested 26 hypotheses and used the Bonferroni method to account for the multiplicity of inferences. 18 By this conservative method, all of our results with reported p-values below .0019 were statistically significant at the 5% level.
Difference-in-differences Regression Model To account for factors other than the reform that may have influenced use contemporaneously with the reform, we estimated a difference-in-differences model which relied on the assumption of common trends in relative changes in treatment record openings over time between adults and youths in absence of the reform. 19 It constructs a counterfactual percentage growth rate from the sample of youths and subtracts this from the growth rate of adults while still providing appropriate confidence intervals. The difference-indifferences model therefore controls for all confounding factors over time that have the same relative impacts on adults and youths. If the results from the main analysis and the difference-in-differences models were similar because the number of treatment record openings among youths did not change much after the reform, we could rule out that other factors apart from the reform were responsible for the differences in treatment record openings before and after the reform under the common trends assumption.
The difference-in-differences model extends the baseline model by including youths and additional terms:
Again, our unit of observation is a day, but is now a vector. consists of the number of daily openings for adults as the first element, and the number of daily openings for youths as the second element, both divided by the mean number of daily openings in 2011 (which was 1,238.8 for adults in regular care and 335.7 for youths in regular care) and multiplied by 100 to express the results as percentage changes. The control variables include interaction terms between the covariates and scalar , which is 1 for daily openings for adults and 0 for daily openings for youths. The second element of is our coefficient of interest, which indicates either the percentage point or absolute drop in the mean number of daily openings in 2012 relative to 2011, conditional on control variables.
Residual Plots Model
The residual plots presented in Figure 1 and Figure 3 of the paper were based on a regression model which modified the baseline model by replacing the year dummies with a vector of holiday dummies :
eResults. Supplemental Results Characteristics of Treatment Records
In the year before the reform, about 3.4% of the adult population of 13.1 million 20 opened a specialist mental health care treatment record (excluding those with adjustment disorder or "other conditions that may be a focus of clinical attention") with a provider observed in our data. eFigure 1 shows treatment record growth rates between 2004 and 2012. Growth rates for 2004 to 2010 were obtained from secondary sources 21, 22 and growth rates for 2011 and 2012 were calculated using our data. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the adult sample in regular care. In each year, more women than men received treatment, and use peaked between ages 35 and 44. Among the nine major diagnosis categories, the most prevalent disorders were depressive disorder, substance-related disorder, and anxiety disorder. The least prevalent disorders were disorder first diagnosed in childhood, miscellaneous disorder, and bipolar disorder. The number of treatment records missing a primary diagnosis declined monotonically from 45,841 in 2010 to 26,110 in 2012. The treatment record system was first introduced in 2008, so this downward trend in the number of records with a missing diagnosis may reflect that the coding of diagnoses improved over time. 23 Treatment records on average had more total treatment minutes in 2012 than in either 2010 or 2011. The average treatment record had total treatment minutes of 1,642 (standard deviation, 2,702) in 2010, 1,703 (SD, 2,586) in 2011, and 1,934 (SD, 2,765) in 2012; the high standard deviations resulted from the fact that there were outlier records in each year with a large number of total treatment minutes. We offer two theoretical explanations of this empirical fact: first, supply-induced demand (i.e. providers encouraged patients to stay in treatment for longer to offset part of the reduced demand for their services) and second, compositional differences (i.e. patients who still sought treatment after the reform were more severely ill, and thus required more treatment, than those who forewent treatment because of the reform). A higher fraction of patients was diagnosed with severe disorders (such as psychotic disorder or bipolar disorder) in 2012 than in 2011, which could indicate that the increase in the intensity of care after the reform was driven at least in part by compositional differences.
Anticipation Effects Individuals could have anticipated the 2012 increase in the out-of-pocket price after the reform was announced on July 26, 2011. Consequently, it was possible that individuals who would otherwise have opened a treatment record in the first months of 2012, instead chose to start treatment in the final months of 2011 to avoid the post-reform out-of-pocket prices. Figure 2b shows some evidence of anticipation by those with on average less severe diagnoses. After the reform was announced on July 26 of 2011, there was a relative rise in treatment openings among patients in treatment for depressive disorder and anxiety disorder, but there was no evidence of anticipation among patients in treatment for psychotic disorder, substance-related disorder, or personality disorder.
We further investigated the presence of such anticipation effects by estimating the baseline regression model on the adult subsample of regular treatment records opened between March 1 and July 26 of each year. The decrease of 8.7% (95% CI, -10.9 to -6.5; P<.001) was slightly lower compared with our main specification but remained substantial and statistically significant. a Ordinary least squares regressions of daily openings of treatment records on year, day-of-the-week, and day-of-the-year indicator variables, income decile dummies, and interactions between the income dummies and all other covariates. Each column shows the coefficient of the interaction between 2012 and the respective income deciles from one regression equation, relative to the omitted income decile. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.
